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Introduction

Sexual harassment has always been present in the workplace. However, discussion of it was
non-existent until the 1970's, when Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to
include a prohibition on sex discrimination in employment. Yet even then, sexual harassment was
not recognized as sex discrimination. In fact, the term "sexual harassment" had not yet been coined.
As Catherine MacKinnon pointed out, women manifested little interest in discussing or complaining
about an experience without a name or a social definition to describe it. 1
Although not discussed in so many words, sexual harassment was prevalent. In 1975, the
Working Women's Institute conducted a study on the subject and found that 70% of respondents
reported having been sexually harassed. A year later Redbook conducted a survey in which 88%
of 9,000 female respondents reported having experienced sexual harassment on the job. Although
this figure may have been overstated in that victims were more likely to respond to the survey than
non-victims, better designed subsequent studies have also reported widespread sexual harassment. 2
These studies, in conjunction with the writings of Catherine MacKinnon, raised national
awareness ofthe problem ofsexual harassment, and may have influenced the 1976 decision in which
a court finally recognized that Title VII forbids the form of sex discrimination now commonly
known as sexual harassment. 3 An explosion of litigation concerning sexual harassment followed
the landmark decision. Courts across the country held that sexual harassment is sex discrimination,

Catherine MacKinnnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 27.
2Matthew C. Hesse and Lester J. Hubble, "The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual
Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning Harassment of Women in the Workplace/"
Washburn Law Journal 24 (1985): p. 575.

'williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
1

and the United States Supreme Court upheld this view in 1986 4
Yet despite being clearly illegal today, sexual harassment is a continuing problem for
women. In a 1988 study, Working Woman magazine reported that 90% of Fortune 500 companies
had received complaints of sexual harassment from employees. S Further, in what is probably the
most comprehensive study of sexual harassment yet conducted, the United States Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) surveyed 23,000 federal employees in 1980, and found that 42% of all
women surveyed reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment. 6 In a 1986 follow-up
study, the MSPB found no substantial change in the reported extent of sexual harassment. 7
For the millions of women who experience it, sexual harassment is a primary manifestation
and vehicle of the subordination of women in the workplace.

It is a phenomenon which is

overwhelmingly directed at women by men, systematically discriminating against women as a
group' Sexual harassment directly demeans and devalues the role of women employees by calling
attention to their sexuality, so that they are viewed as sex objects rather than people 9

Sexual

harassment is most prevalent where women work in traditionally male-dominated occupations. As
rarities in such fields, women will often be stereotyped and objectified and thus undermined as
workers. 1O Sexual harassment in this context has the effect of forcing women out of the workplace
'106 I.Ct. 2399 (1986).
5LA Times, October 21, 1990, Part A, Sunday Home Edition at 1, col. 1.
6S exua l Harassment in the Federal Workplace--Is It a Problem?

(MSPB 1981).

7Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government: An Update 16 (MSPB 1988).
8Francis Carleton, ~Women in the Workplace and Sex Discrimination Law: A
Feminist Analysis of Federal Jurisprudence," Women & Politics, 13 (1993), p. 3.

9Jane L. Dolkart, "Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Equality, Obejctivity,
and the Shaping of Legal Standards/" Emory Law Journal 43 (Winter 1994): 187.
lOrd at 184.
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and halting their incursions upward in the workplace hierarchy."
Studies show that an atmosphere which stereotypes women as sex objects affects the ability
of women to do their jobs. This stereotyping overwhelms a view of women as capable, committed
workers, and in effect, blots out all other characteristics. Sexual stereotyping forces women to
monitor or alter their behavior either to conform to the stereotyping, in an effort to be accepted on
some level, or to make clear that they are rejecting sex-object status.

The resulting anxiety,

emotional upset, and expanded effort which could otherwise be directed toward job performance is
the burden that sexual harassment places on women. This burden constitutes an employment barrier,
and therefore, discrimination. 12
The effects of bearing the burden of sexual harassment can be profound. Many employees

will simply leave the job or request a transfer rather than endure the harassment. In one study, 42%
of sexual harassment victims left their jobs and another 24% were fired. Thus, 66% of the victims

in the study were driven out of their jobs by sexual harassment. The costs to these victims included
loss of income and seniority, a disrupted work history, problems with obtaining references for future
jobs, loss of confidence in seeking a new job, and loss of career advancement. 13
Although the law on sexual harassment has been a major ally of women in their fight to gain
full equality in the workplace, its development has been haphazard since no clear definition of the
phenomenon has been agreed upon by the federal courts. Cases which have been factually similar

HId at 186.
12Amy Horton, "Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment,
the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII," University of Miami Law Review
46 (1991): 442.
13 Jane L. Dolkart,
"Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Equality,
Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards," Emory Law Journal 43 (Winter 1994):
187.
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have resulted in different findings depending upon the circuit in which they were heard, the standard
applied, and the judge presiding. This confusion over the definition of sexual harassment still
plagues the law today. Thus sexual harassment is an interesting issue to examine because many
legal questions remain unanswered. This paper will look at sexual harassment in two respects: first,
a substantive examination ofthe development of sexual harassment law, highlighting the legal issues
which remain unsettled; and second, an examination of judicial decision-making in this new and
developing area oflaw.

Title VII and EEOC Guidelines
In 1964 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act to prevent discrimination against
individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. In 1972 Title VII of that act
was amended to include the prohibition of gender discrimination in employment. It states:
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin14
There is little legislative history to explain this amendment to Title VII. In fact, the prohibition
on sex discrimination was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives by opponents of the bill who thought that its addition would cause the bill to

"42 U.S.C.S. sec. 2000e-2 la) (1972).
4

fail. They were wrong, and the bill passed quickly, leaving little history on legislative intent."
Although Title VII outlaws sex discrimination in employment, federal courts initially
interpreted its prohibition narrowly so as not to include harassment. Before 1976 the courts
rejected the idea that sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII as a form of sex
discrimination. In the 1974 case of Barnes v. Train!6, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia denied relief to a plaintiff who was discharged for refusing to acquiesce to the sexual
advances of her employer. The court found that the plaintiff was discharged not on the basis of
her sex, but rather because she would not submit to the sexual advances of her supervisor. At the
time, such a view of sexual harassment as a personal rather than a business matter was
commonplace. It was argued and accepted that men would naturally find their female co
workers sexually attractive, and thus would naturally pursue them. Women were to expect such
advances when they moved into the workplace. Following Barnes, other federal district courts
used this line of reasoning and refused to hold that sexual harassment was actionable under Title
VII. 17 As views concerning the position of women have changed, this reasoning has been
deemed invalid.
Finally, in Williams v. Saxbe (1976)" a federal district court acknowledged that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination. In Williams, as in Barnes, the plaintiff alleged that
she was harassed, humiliated, and eventually fired for refusing her supervisor's sexual advances.

110 Congo Roc. 2577-2584
"13 Fair Empl. Puc. Ca•.

(1964).
(BNA)

123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974)

17Thomas Gehring, "Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment After Harris: Abolishing
the Requirement of Psychological Injury," Thurgood Marshall Law Review 19 (Feb. 1994):
463.
"413 F. Supp. 654

(D.D.C. 1976).
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Here, however, the court rejected the defendant's contention that he had discriminated not
against women, but only against people who refused to submit to his sexual demands. The court
held that the plaintiffs harassment and discharge did create a cause of action under Title VII
because "the conduct of the plaintiffs supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment
which was placed before one gender and not the other. ,,19
Soon after the Williams holding, the Barnes decision was reversed upon appeal, and
federal courts began to accept the idea that sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination
in violation of Title VII. However, although these two decisions established that the behavior in
the two cases was discriminatory, the decisions did not set out a clear definition of sexual
harassment, nor the criteria for determining its presence. As a result, the federal circuits handed
down conflicting, inconsistent decisions in the sexual harassment cases that followed.
The confusion surrounding this issue prompted the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency which enforces Title VII's provisions, to develop a
framework for analyzing sexual harassment claims in 1980. Congress had granted the EEOC the
power to issue regulations in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Such regulations are non-binding
"administrative interpretations" of the Act, but "constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. "20 Thus, in 1980 the
EEOC published its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. These Guidelines followed
well-established judicial decisions and EEOC precedent in the areas of discrimination based on

19Id at 657-658.
20General Electric Co. V. Gilbert,

429 U.S. 125, 141-42
6

(1976).

race, religion, or national origin. 21
In its Guidelines, the EEOC stated that "sexual harassment, like harassment on the basis
of color, race, religion, or national origin, has long been recognized by the EEOC as a violation
of Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of \964, as amended. However, despite the
position taken by the Commission, sexual harassment continues to be especially widespread."
As a result, the EEOC felt that they needed to issue guidelines to guide courts in dealing sexual
harassment. 22 These guidelines state:
Sec. \604.11 Sexual Harassment.
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation ofSec.703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. 23
The guidelines also state that
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which
the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular
action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis 24
The guidelines proved to be instrumental in expanding sexual harassment law. Before
the EEOC presented its guidelines, the courts had made findings of sexual harassment only in
21Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1990), p. 14.
22Interim Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. sec. 1604.11 (1980).
23

29 C.F.R. sec. 1604.11 (1980).

7

cases in which women suffered tangible economic injury as a result of refusing the sexual
advances or demands or a supervisor or employer. This type of harassment, termed quid pro quo
sexual harassment, is described in section 1604.11(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the EEOC Guidelines.
The behavior described in section 1604.11(a)(3), however, now called hostile environment
sexual harassment, had not yet been conceived by the courts. Thus, in proscribing behavior
which creates an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment," the EEOC opened a
new avenue in which women could press claims of sexual harassment. As a result, the EEOC
Guidelines have been the most important source of sexual harassment law. They are significant
in that any sexual harassment claims must be processed by the EEOC before they proceed to
federal court. Further, judges will look to such administrative guidelines in making their
interpretation of and ruling on the law.
Yet there are some problems with the EEOC guidelines. For example, by defining sexual
harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature," the EEOC focuses on harassment of a sexual nature rather
than harassment due to gender. 2S By defining sexual harassment in this way, the EEOC has led
some courts into believing that sex-based harassment must necessarily involve sexual conduct.
After some courts interpreted the guidelines in this manner, the EEOC clarified its interpretation
of sexual harassment:
Although the Guidelines specifically address conduct that is sexual in nature, the
Commission notes that sex-based harassment--that is, harassment not involving
sexual activity or language--may also give rise to Title VII liability Gust as in the
case of harassment based on race, national origin, or religion) ifit is "sufficiently

"29 C.F.R. sec. 1604.11 (1980).
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patterned or pervasive" and directed at employees because of their sex. ,,26

Early Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases
When the EEOC issued its guidelines in 1980, the only issue settled in the courts was that
sexual harassment did indeed constitute gender discrimination under Title VII. 27 Several legal
issues remained unresolved. For example, the courts had yet to determine:
1. Whether proof of tangible economic injury was necessary for a finding of sexual
harassment;
2. Whether sexual harassment included only sexual advances and other sexually-related
conduct, or whether behavior which was not sexual but discriminated on the basis
of sex was included;
3. Whether the courts should use an objective or subjective standard in deciding
sexual harassment claims;
4. How pervasive a behavior must be to constitute hostile environment sexual
harassment;
5. Whether an employer could be held liable for the actions of his supervisors and
workers; and
6. Whether sexual harassment claims may threaten the free speech rights of employees
in the workplace.
Over time, some of these questions have been settled by the courts, while others have not.
Based on Section 1604.11(a)(3) of the 1980 EEOC guidelines, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia made a finding of hostile environment sexual harassment in the
landmark case, Bundy v. Jackson (1981)2' In Bundy. a female employee who complained to her
supervisor that she had been propositioned by two co-workers was told, "any man in his right
mind would want to rape you" and then was propositioned by the supervisor himsel[2' The

26EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) sec. 615.6, p. 17-18 (1990).
21Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654

"641 F.2d 934

(D. D.C. 1976).

(D.C. Cir. 1981).

29Id at 940.

9

plaintiff claimed that in addition to the continual sexual advances, her co-workers and
supervisors had questioned her about her sexual proclivities, ignored her complaints, criticized
her work performance, and blocked her bid for promotion.'o Drawing from precedent on racial,
religious, and national origin hostile environment cases, the court said:
The relevance of these "discriminatory environment" cases to sexual harassment is
beyond serious dispute. Racial or ethnic discrimination against a company's minority
clients may reflect no intent to discriminate directly against the company's minority
employees, but in poisoning the atmosphere of employment it violates Title VII. Racial
slurs, though intentional and directed at individuals, may still be just verbal insults, yet
they too may create Title VII liability. How then can sexual harassment, which
injects the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and
which always represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy,
not be illegal?31
Although no court had yet recognized hostile environment sexual harassment, the court agreed
with the plaintiff and the EEOC that the conditions of employment include the psychological and
emotional work environment, and that the sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning
propositions to which she was indisputably subjected, and which caused her anxiety and
debilitation, illegally poisoned that environment and so discriminated against her. 32 It stated:
[t]hough no court has as yet so held, we believe that an affirmative answer follows
ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII violations where an employer created
or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the
complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the discrimination. 33
Thus, based upon Section 1604.11(a)(3) of the EEOC Guidelines, the Bundy court upheld
a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment for the first time. According to this theory, a

30Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice (New York:
Wiley Law Publications, 1990), p.32.
"641 F.2d 934

(D.C. Cir. 1981) at 945.

32Annot., 78 A.L.R. Fed. 260 (19__ ).
"641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir. 1981) at 943-944.
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hostile work environment exists and is actionable under Title VII if the workplace is heavily
charged with sex discrimination, even if the hostile environment does not result in a tangible
economic injury.34 The Bundy decision effectively determined that proof of tangible economic
injury is not necessary to win on a claim of sexual harassment.
The Bundy decision also offered guidance on the issue of employer liability, stating that
"an employer is liable for discriminatory acts committed by supervisory personnel. »35 This
holding followed the EEOC Guidelines and a previous court holding. 36 However, unlike the
economic injury question, the issue of employer liability was not settled here, and courts
continued to hand down different holdings on the matter.
Shortly after Bundy the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals used the hostile environment
sexual harassment theory established in Bundy to decide Henson v. City of Dundee (1982).37
The plaintiff, a police dispatcher, alleged that she had resigned under duress because she had
been threatened with discharge if she did not yield to the police chief's sexual advances, and was
prevented from attending the police academy because she did not comply with his demands. In
its decision the court drew upon the history of racial harassment decisions, and compared such
harassment to sexual harassment. The Court stated that
[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that
racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman
run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work

3~Amy Horton t ~Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment,
the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII," University of Miami Law Review 46
(1991): 411.

-641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir. 1981) at 943.
36Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983
"682 F.2d 897

(D.C.Cir. 1977) at 993.

(11th CiL 1982).
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and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of
racial epithets. 3'
Addressing the economic injury issue, the court reinforced Bundy's holding that under
certain circumstances, the creation of an offensive or hostile work environment due to sexual
harassment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether the complainant suffers tangible job
inJury. It stated:
A pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of her sex is a pattern
of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one sex with respect
to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. There is no requirement that an
employee subjected to such disparate treatment prove in addition that she has suffered
tangible job detriment. 39
The court also considered whether harassment must be of a sexual nature or
merely based upon sex within its discussion of the prima facie elements of hostile environment
sexual harassment. Prima facie evidence is proof, which if not later contradicted or in some way
explained, is sufficient to sustain one's c1aim 40 The court held that these elements were:
I.
2.
3.
4.

The employee was a member of a protected group;
The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual advances;
The harassment was based on sex;
The harassment affected a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment; and
5. The harassment was either actively or constructively
known by the employer who failed to take prompt
remedial action. 41

The court's second element would seem to mean that sexual harassment must involve

"682 F.2d 897

(11th Cir. 1982) at 902.

J9Ibid.
4°Albert P. Melone, Researching Constitutional Law,
Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 172.

HId at 903-905.
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(United States: Harper

conduct of a sexual nature, and in its discussion of this element, the court did focus on sexual
advances. However, in its third element, the court seems also to accept harassment which a
plaintiff would not have suffered "but for the fact of her sex.,,42 Such harassment could
conceivably include behavior which involved no sexual elements at all, but that nonetheless
discriminated against women. Yet here again the court discussed this requirement in terms of
sexual advances, and thus drew no clear lines on this issue.
The fourth prima facie element, whether the detriment caused by the harassment is
sufficiently severe to be actionable under Title VII, is probably the most important and difficult
question to answer in a hostile environment sexual harassment case. In discussing the question,
the Henson court stated that in order to affect a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment,
the action must be pervasive and "sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the
psychological well-being of the employee," and that this determination must be made with
regard to the "totality of the circumstances. "43 Some later courts interpreted this statement to
mean that proof of psychological injury is necessary to prevail on a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. Others, however, have taken this to mean that the complainant need not wait
for psychological injury to occur before pressing a claim of sexual harassment, so long as the
harassment could reasonably be expected to have that effect. 44
Finally, the court addressed the issue of employer liability. The court retreated from the
holding in Bundy, deciding that in the case of hostile environment sexual harassment, an

42rd at 904.

HId at 904.

UBarbara Lindemann and David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law,
(Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of National Affairs 1 1992) I p. 175.
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employer could only be liable if he knew or should have known of the harassment in question
and failed to take prompt remedial action. 45
Thus, in Henson, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a finding of hostile environment sexual
harassment, declaring no need for tangible economic injury to be proven on such a claim. The
court drew no clear conclusions about whether actionable conduct must be sexual in nature or
merely gender-based. The court discussed the pervasiveness question, but issued no definitive
statements on it. Finally, the Henson court upheld employer liability only when the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment, and took no action to end it.
Courts in other circuits expanded the prima facie framework established in Henson. For
instance, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. (1986)46, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals used a
slightly-modified prima facie test and refused to find a hostile work environment where the
workplace contained posters of naked and partially-dressed women, and where male employees
customarily called women derogatory names. The Rabidue court adopted the prima facie
requirements set in Henson: that the employee was a member of a protected class; that the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal
or physical contact of a sexual nature; that the harassment complained of was based on sex; that
the conduct had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the complainant's work performance
and creating an intimidating or offensive working environment; and employer liability where the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and took no corrective action. Yet
although the Rabidue court adopted the Henson framework, it took a clear position in discussing

45rd at 905.
"805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
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the fourth requirement, and stated that the conditions of a worker's employment are not altered
unless the harassment "is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological
well-being of employees". 41
Further, the Rabidue court declared that in reviewing allegedly harassing behavior, the
trier of fact should adopt the perspective of a reasonable person. 48 The majority argued that a
reasonable person would not have found the alleged conduct to constitute harassment. The
court stated:
Indeed it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and
language are rough, hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and
girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to--nor can--change this...
[I]t is quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers. 49
In finding that the plaintiff was "a capable, independent, ambitious, aggressive,
intractable, and opinionated woman", the court reasoned that the actions of the defendants did
not cause the plaintiff severe psychological injury, and therefore were not actionable under Title
VII. The majority held that the sexist remarks and pin-up posters had only a "de minimis" effect
on the plaintiffs work environment when considered "in the context of a society that condones
and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica".'o
In his dissent, Judge Keith argued that the majority's finding that the work environment
was not hostile was flawed. Keith argued that "Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such
behavior and attitudes from poisoning the work environment of classes protected under the

"682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
"805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) at 620.
"80S F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) at 620-621.
50Ibid at 612-613.
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Act.,,'l Judge Keith argued that instead of viewing the work environment from a "reasonable
person" perspective, the court should look at the behavior as a "reasonable woman" would. He
said:
In my view, the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence
between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those ofmen.. .I would
have the courts adopt the perspective of the reasonable victim which simultaneously
allows courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield employers
from the neurotic complainant. Moreover, unless the outlook of the reasonable woman
is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained
notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.'2

Further, Keith stated:
I hardly believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degradation and
exploitation of female sexuality perpetrated in American culture. In fact, pervasive
societal approval thereof and of other stereotypes stifles female potential and instill
the debased sense of self worth which accompanies stigmatization. The presence
of pin-ups and misogynous language in the workplace can only evoke and confirm
the debilitating norms by which women are primarily and contemptuously valued
as objects of male sexual fantasy. That some men would condone and wish to
perpetuate such behavior is not surprising. However, the relevant inquiry at hand
is what the reasonable woman would find offensive, not society, which at one point
also condoned slavery. 53
Legal scholars also criticized the Rabidue decision, arguing that it had adopted the perspective of
a "reasonable male" rather than that of a "reasonable women". One critic argued,
The traditional perspective [of the "reasonable person"] abounds with myths based
on male perceptions that it is harmless kidding around, that women really welcome
the sexual overtures, that "no" is really a coy way of saying "yes", and that women
who complain, far from being reasonable, are overly sensitive or prudish or are too
assertive or unable to get along with people. When courts allow these male myths
to infect their measurement of a reasonable person, they bias the formulation of the
standard itself and trivialize sexual harassment by assuming that the complained-of
SlId at 626.

U8DS F.2d 611 (6th Clr. 1986) at 626.
SJId at 627.
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conduct is not really serious or harmful. 54
Although the majority in Rabidue adopted a reasonable person view, Keith's dissent led
some courts to subsequently adopt a reasonable women perspective. Further, following Rabidue,
many courts adopted a dual objective-subjective standard in which the court must determine, in
objective terms, the likely effect of the offensive conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to
perform work and upon that person's well-being, and in subjective terms, the actual effect upon
the particular complainant. 55

The Supreme Court Rules on Sexual Harassment in the Meritor Case
The United States Supreme Court regularly accepts cases for review that involve points
oflaw which have been decided differently by different lower courts. In the case of hostile
environment sexual harassment decisions, the federal circuits have handed down various
interpretations of the elements necessary to prove a Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. For example, the courts have disagreed on whether a hostile environment
must cause psychological injury in order to be actionable under Title VII, under what conditions
an employer can be held responsible for the acts of his supervisors in an hostile environment
claim, and the proper standard to be used in deciding a hostile environment sexual harassment
case. As a result, in 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case of Meritor

5~FinleYI "A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Tort's Course,"
Yale Journal of Law and Fe~nism 41(1989): pp. 60-62.

SSKoster v. chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F.Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1482 (3rd Cir. 1986); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1990); Yates v. Aveo Corp.; 819 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987): Docter
v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.;
605 F.Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
17

Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986)S6 and considered a claim of sexual harassment for the first time.
The case originated from an expansive hostile environment ruling from the Third Circuit
in Vinson v. Taylor (1985). S7 In that case, Vinson, an assistant branch manager of a savings and
loan association, claimed that she had been sexually harassed by the bank's manager. Vinson
testified that after initially declining sexual advances by the manager she submitted because she
was afraid that her continued refusal would jeopardize her employment. Vinson stated that she
was forced to submit to sexual advances by the manager both during and after business hours,
that the manager fondled her in front of other female employees, that he followed her into the
woman's restroom and exposed himself to her, and that he even forcibly raped her on several
occasions. Reversing the district court's finding that Vinson was not required to grant sexual
favors as a condition of her employment, the Court of Appeals found that the manager's actions
constituted pervasive on-the-job sexual harassment 58 The court also held that an employer was
absolutely liable for sexual harassment by its supervisors, whether or not the employer knew or
should have known of the misconduct. S9 Taylor's employer, Meritor Savings Bank, appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court.
In its decision, the Supreme Court began by stating that Title VII protects workers from
sexual harassment. The Court stated, "without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of

"106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986).
n753 F. 2d 141 (D.C. ClE. 1985).
58Annot.,

78 A.L.R. Fed. 261 (19_).

59Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice (New York:
Wiley Law Publications, 1990), p. 35-36.
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sex."60 Second, the Court upheld the holding established in several lower federal courts that
Title VII's protections are not limited to disparate wages or other "economic" or "tangible"
benefits of employment, stating "the phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment'
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women in employment'. ,,61
In an attempt to define hostile environment sexual harassment, the Court noted that the
EEOC guidelines state that actionable conduct includes" [u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. ,,62 Further, the Court
stated, the guidelines provide that
such sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited "sexual harassment" whether or not it is
directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where "such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creates an offensive working environment"63
The Court stated that the manager's conduct in this case, "which include[d) not only pervasive
harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature... [was] plainly sufficient to state
a claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment".64 Yet the Court failed to establish whether
harassment of a non-sexual nature, but nevertheless based on gender, was actionable under Title
VII.
The Supreme Court also rejected the district court's holding that the conduct could not

-106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) at 2404.
61Id quoting LA Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.s. 702 (1978).
"29 C.F.R. sec. 1604.11(a) (1985).
6~eritor

v. Vinson,

106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) at 2404, citing sec.

1604.11 (a) (3) (1985) .
M106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) at 2405-2406.
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constitute harassment since Vinson's sexual relations with the manager were voluntary. Stating
that a plaintiffs voluntary submission to sexual conduct was not a defense to sexual harassment
under Title VII, the Court said:
The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
"unwelcome." While the question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome
presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determination
committed to the trier of fact, the District Court in this case erroneously focused on the
"voluntariness" of respondent's participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The correct
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary·'
However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal's holding that evidence of an
employee's sexually provocative speech and dress are inadmissible in a sexual harassment trial.
The Court held that such evidence is relevant in determining whether sexual advances were
unwelcome, since the EEOC guidelines emphasize that the trier offact must consider "the record
as a whole" and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred". 66 Thus, the Supreme Court stated that courts
should consider whether the plaintiff reported the incidents of harassment, the plaintiffs dress
and appearance, and the plaintiffs relationship with the alleged harasser, in determining whether
sexual conduct is unwelcome. 67
The Supreme Court failed to issue a definitive statement on employer liability, saying
only that the mere existence of an employee grievance procedure and a policy against
discrimination, coupled with the plaintiffs failure to invoke that procedure, does not necessarily

8106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) at 2406.
"29 C.F.R. sec. 1604.11(b) (1985).
61 Barbara Berish Brown and Intra L. Germanis,
"Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment: Has Harris Really Changed Things?" Employee Relations Law Journal 19
(Spring 1994): 567.
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insulate the employer from liability for its supervisors' sexual harassment. The Court further
stated that courts should look to the EEOC's agency principles for guidance in this area 6 ' The
Court noted that according to the EEOC's traditional agency guidelines,
where a supervisor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by
making or threatening to make decisions affecting the employment status of his
subordinates, such actions are properly imputed to the employer whose delegation of
authority empowered the supervisor to undertake them 6 "
Thus, Meritor did take an important step in recognizing hostile environment sexual
harassment as a valid cause of action under Title VII. However, in terms of the prima facie
elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, the court failed to state whether
harassment on the basis of gender was a form of sexual harassment. On the "pervasiveness"
issue, the Court required that the harassment be so pervasive as to affect a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment, but it failed to instruct the courts about what this meant. Further, the
court further did not comment on whether a woman must suffer psychological injury before the
conduct would be considered pervasive enough to be actionable. The Court instructed lower
courts to use a totality of circumstances approach, and as a result, the lower courts have been
given little guidance on how to determine when hostile environment sexual harassment is severe
and pervasive enough to be a legal violation. Indeed, such an approach leaves courts
considerable leeway to develop their own definition of what constitutes actionable harassment.
Finally, the Court avoided deciding the issue of employer liability, merely instructing the lower
courts to look to traditional agency principles, such as those found in the EEOC Guidelines on
Harassment Because of Sex. One potential problem with this recommendation is that the lower

-106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) at 2408.
69Id at 2407.
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court decisions since 1980 had looked to the EEOC Guidelines, and yet the courts still came up
with different findings.

Expansion of Hostile Environment Case Law
Post-Meritor case law reflected confusion and uncertainty about the contours of hostile
environment sexual harassment. In particular, the federal courts of appeal continued to disagree
about what conduct is sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive work environment 7 • Many rulings following Meritor turned to more
liberal criteria for a finding of hostile environment sexual harassment than had previously been
used.
For instance, many courts made findings of hostile environment sexual harassment on the
basis of the existence of sexist or derogatory speech or sexually-explicit materials in the
workplace. In 1990 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Priscilla Kelsey Andrews had
been sexually harassed in a hostile work environment similar to those rejected in Rabidue
(1986) and Scott (1986). In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia (1990)71, the court held that the
pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women, and the posting of sexually
explicit pictures in common areas, could serve as evidence of hostile environment sexual
harassment. The court reasoned that in order to make a case under Title VII it is only necessary
to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff "had not

70Jane L. Dolkart, "Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Equality, Objectivity,
and the Shaping of Legal Standards," Emory Law Journal 43 (Winter 1994): 161.
"895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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been a woman she would not have been treated in the same manner. ,,72 Thus the Andrews court
differed from previous decisions in defining sexual harassment not as unwelcome sexual
advances, but as discriminatory behavior on the basis of gender. 73
In Ellison v. Brady 74, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Andrews court
and resoundingly rejected the reasoning of both Rabidue and Scott, stating that their analyses did
not follow from the analysis set forth in Meritor. Using the reasoning set by Judge Keith in his
Rabidue dissent, the court stated, "conduct many men consider unobjectionable may offend
many women. ,,75 The court adopted the reasonable woman standard arguing that
in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus
on the perspective of the victim. If we only examined whether a reasonable person
would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing
the prevailing level of discrimination. 76
The court also offered some clarification of the pervasiveness element. The court stated
that "hostile work environment harassment exists when conduct which has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment is present. ,,77 The court offered a sort of yardstick for
judging action by stating that in determining whether conduct is pervasive enough to be
actionable, the required showing of severity of conduct should vary inversely with the
pervasiveness of the conduct. In addition, the court stated that employees need not endure

12Id at 1485.
73Id at 1478.
"924 F.2d 872

(9th Cir. 1991).

"924 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1991).
"924 F.2d 872

(9th Cir. 1991) at 878.

17Ibid.
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sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent that
they suffer anxiety and debilitation.
The most expansive decision concerning hostile environment sexual harassment was
handed down in by a federal district court in Florida. In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards.
Inc.. (1991).78 Lois Robinson, a female welder in a predominantly male workforce, claimed that
she had been subject to pervasive sexual harassment. Throughout her employment at JSI, male
workers posted pictures of nude and partially-nude women prominently in common work areas
and in selective spots where Robinson could not avoid encountering them directly. At one time,
a "Men Only" sign was painted on the door of the shipfitter's trailer, a work area that Robinson
could not avoid during her daily routines. Further, Robinson received remarks from co-workers
that were sexually suggestive or offensive to her. Robinson complained about the behavior
repeatedly to both her supervisors and her male co-workers, but no action was taken to stop the
harassment. 79
In its decision, the court found that the posting of sexually-oriented pictures, together
with the sexual remarks, created a hostile environment in violation of Title VII. The court went
beyond the previous rulings in Rabidue and Andrews that held that sexually-explicit material in
the workplace could serve as evidence of a hostile environment. The Robinson court declared
that the sexually-explicit material itself created the hostile environment and fomented the

"760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).

79Nell J. Medlin, "Expanding the Law of Sexual Harassment to Include Workplace
Pornography: Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards. Inc.," Stetson Law Review 21 (Spring
1992): 656.
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additional incidents. 8o In issuing an extensive remedial order prohibiting possession or display
of such material in the workplace, the court held that the pictures containing nudity were not
protected speech because they acted as discriminatory conduct in creating a hostile work
environment. The court cited several justifications for its prohibition on such pictures: that it
created a special harm which can be regulated, that it is a time, place, and manner restriction
which is narrowly tailored, and that the women employees of lSI were members of a captive
audience. 81
The Robinson decision is significant in that it expanded the concept of sexual harassment
in the workplace. The decision acknowledged that the presence of sexist speech or sexually
explicit materials may in themselves create a hostile environment. Further, the decision
demonstrated sensitivity to women like Robinson who are employed in workplaces which are
predominantly male. While the Robinson holding was limited to specific workplace
circumstances, it has great potential for facilitating a broader understanding of sexual
harassment. 82

The Supreme Court Rules

A~ain

in Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc.

In 1993, the Supreme Court handed down its second and most recent ruling on hostile
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environment sexual harassment in the case of Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc. (1993).83 The
plaintiff in the case, Teresa Harris, had been subject to continual sex-based derogatory speech
and conduct from her company's president, Charles Hardy. Hardy often made sexist remarks to
and about Harris in front of other employees. He said things like, "You're a woman, what do you
know?" and "We need a man [in your position]". He once said, "Let's go to the Holiday Inn to
negotiate your raise." Further, after Harris had secured a business deal, Hardy said, "What did
you do, Teresa, promise the guy [sex] Saturday night?" In addition, Hardy often asked Harris
and other women to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket, and regularly threw objects on the
ground in front of Harris and other women, telling them to pick them up, so that he could look at
them and comment on exposed parts of their bodies. 84
At trial, the district court judge adopted the magistrate's finding that Hardy was "a vulgar
man" who "demeans the female employees at his workplace," but said that his behavior was
merely "annoying and insensitive" and not sufficiently severe to seriously affect Harris'
psychological well-being. The district court's finding that no hostile environment sexual
harassment existed was affirmed without comment by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 85
In Harris, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow issue of whether proof of
severe psychological injury is required to prevail on a Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. In light of the disarray among the circuits, however, the Court also attempted
to claritY the legal definition of a discriminatory hostile work environment. Speaking for the

"114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).
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majority, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed the Meritor standard for conduct that it be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. ,,'6 Justice O'Connor described this as
"a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. ,,'7 Employing the dual objective-subjective
standard which arose out of Rabidue, the Court held that discrimination thus occurs when
conduct is "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,,," and
which the victim subjectively perceives to be abusive. '9 The Court emphasized that "Title VII
comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown" because a hostile
work environment, "even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being,
can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. ,,90
Like previous decisions, the Harris holding encouraged the courts to use a totality-of
circumstances approach. The Court stated that the factors to consider include, but are not limited
to: the frequency ofthe harassing conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, whether it unreasonably interferes with work performance, and possible
psychological injury.9! As stated previously, such a standard can, and has, lead to varying
86Barbara Berish Brown and Intra L. Germanis, "Hostile Environment Sexual

Harassment: Has Harris Really Changed Things?" EmPloyee Relations Law Journal 19
(Spring 1994): 571.

nl14 S.Ct. 367 (1993) at 370.
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89Ibid.
90Id at 370-371.
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applications of the law around the country.
Therefore, in Harris the Supreme Court failed to adopt any bright line standards to
distinguish between "merely offensive" conduct and actionable conduct, other than to say that
harassment does not have to cause psychological injury before it constitutes a legal violation.
The Harris decision thus left several questions oflaw unanswered. For instance, the Court did
not resolve the conflicting holdings of the lower federal courts concerning whether the presence
of sexist speech or sexually-explicit pictures alone can create a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII.
However, the Court did quote Meritor, saying that "the mere utterance of an...epithet
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of
employment to implicate Title VII, ,,92 it nevertheless remains unclear whether such sexist
epithets, when stated repeatedly, could have the effect of discriminating on the basis of gender
and thus violate Title VII. The Court does seem open to this possibility since it stated that
"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment, Title VII is violated. ,,93 Seemingly, such "intimidation, ridicule,
and insult" could be purely verbal.

Does Title VII Limit Freedom of Expression in the Workplace?
In determining whether sexist speech or sexually-explicit material alone can violate Title

"114 S.Ct. 367
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VII, courts must detennine whether such speech deserves any First Amendment protection, and
if so, how much. The EEOC has issued guidelines classifYing certain expressive conduct as
proscribable workplace harassment. Its 1980 guidelines specifically state that" ...verbal conduct
ofa sexual nature constitute[s] sexual harassment" when it creates a hostile work environment."'
Nevertheless, there has been almost no judicial or academic discussion of the extent to which
these guidelines may be enforced without infringing on freedom of speech. 9' Most courts which
have made findings of hostile environment sexual harassment have based those findings upon
unwanted touchings or physical assaults. In most cases where a Title VII claim has been made
because of sexist speech or sexually-explicit material, the claims have not been upheld. Further,
as demonstrated earlier, the few courts which have addressed this question have done so in a
cursory fashion. For example, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 96, the court questioned
whether the First Amendment pennits the judiciary to prohibit people from using offensive, yet
not obscene language. The court, however, never resolved the question, deciding the case on
statutory grounds instead 97
Nevertheless, it is essential that this legal dilemma be resolved because of the special
problem in trying to achieve full equality for women and protect freedom of expression at the
same time. Ensuring equal employment conditions requires addressing the more subtle ways in
which women are excluded from full participation in the workplace. Many women argue that
sexist speech in the workplace should be regulated since"sexist speech in the employment
M29 C.F.R. sec. 1604.11 (1980).

95Nadine Strossen, "Freedoms in Conflict," Index on Censorship 22 (Jan. 1993): 7.
-805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
91Mary Strauss, "Sexist Speech in the Workplace," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 25 (1990): 3.
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context has unique and qualitatively different effects than does such speech elsewhere, since
women have historically been discriminated against in employment. ,,98 Sexist speech reinforces
barriers in the workplace based upon gender. When as a result of being subjected to sexist
speech women leave the job, or persist but with decreased productivity, male dominance, rather
than gender equality, in the workplace is perpetuated. 99 Thus, favoring the First Amendment
right to free speech in the employment context can feed a power dynamic which discriminates
against women. 100
Perhaps one reason that courts have found it difficult to deal with the question of sexist
speech as sexual harassment is that it is difficult both to define and to categorize sexist speech.
A functional definition has been provided by Marcy Strauss, who described sexist speech as:
1) speech demanding or requesting sexual relationships;
2) sexually explicit speech directed at women;
3) degrading speech directed at women because of their
gender; or
4) sexually explicit or degrading speech that women
employees know exists in the workplace, even though it
is not directed at them. lOl

It is well established that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech was created to
protect political speech, which includes expression about philosophical, social, artistic,
economic, literary, and ethical matters. 102 Many civil libertarians argue that sexist speech is

9~arcy Strauss, "Sexist Speech in the Workplace," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
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inherently political, in that it deals with ideas about a woman's role and responsibility in society,
and therefore even in the workplace, should be protected by the First Amendment. 103 Yet while
political speech is afforded greater protection than other types of expression, the right to free
speech has never been held to be absolute, and the Supreme Court has stated on several
occasions that the state may even regulate political speech in some instances. Further, the
Supreme Court has increasingly drawn a distinction between political speech and sexist speech,
recognizing greater state authority to regulate sexist speech than other types of expression which
go more to the "core" of the First Amendment. '04 Ordinarily, the state's interest in regulating
sexist speech overrides the right to free speech if a compelling state interest exists. 105
In the case of sexist speech which permeates a workplace and causes a hostile
environment, a compelling state interest clearly exists. There are several reasons for regulating
sexist speech. First, the state has an interest in preventing the offense and hurt suffered by
victims of sexist speech. Most victims of sexual harassment through sexist speech experience
isolation, decreased job satisfaction, and diminished ambition as a result of their feelings of
personal anguish and poweriessness. '06 Second, the state has an interest in promoting gender
equality in the workplace. Since sexist speech effectively causes inequality by creating a hostile
or abusive work environment, it may be regulated by the state.
Finally, the state has an interest in protecting women as captive audiences in the

l03Id at 25-26.

l04NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) and First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 776 (1978).
lO~arcy Strauss, "Sexist Speech in the Workplace," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 25 (1990): 23.

l06Id at 11.

31

workplace. 101 The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment permits the government to
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the "captive" audience cannot avoid the
expression. 108 Although the Court has not precisely defined the concept of a captive audience,
the definition at least requires that the individual in question be in a particular place at a
particular time to pursue an important purpose. I09 Thus, when a co-worker or supervisor directs
the sexist speech at a female worker, her ability to avoid such speech is severely limited. In such
circumstances, a finding of captivity is reasonable, and the speech may be regulated without
abridging the First Amendment. Further, when sexist speech permeates the work environment,
even if it is not directed at any particular employee, a female employee is in effect a captive
audience because the only way for her to avoid the sexism is to leave her job.

Conclusion

Congress, the EEOC, and the federal courts have all contributed to the development of
sexual harassment law. Each, in its own realm, has acted to protect women from the invidious,
discriminatory behavior often directed against them in the workplace. While in some instances
the courts have failed to punish discriminatory behavior, due to traditional male perspectives on
sexual harassment, since 1976, the courts and the EEOC have made great progress in providing
women with a forum for pressing their claims of gender discrimination.
The Supreme Court has settled some issues Iflaw. First, it has held that sexual

l07Ibid.
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harassment qualifies as sex discrimination under Title VII. Second, the Court has stated that
harassment need not cause tangible economic injury nor psychological injury to be actionable.
Third, the Court has held that courts should use a dual subjective-objective standard in judging
sexual harassment claims.
The law, however, is not perfect. The Supreme Court has failed to address many issues
in sexual harassment cases which lower courts are struggling to resolve. It has never definitively
stated whether sexual harassment consists only of conduct of a sexual nature, or if non-sexual
gender-based conduct is included as well. The Supreme Court has said little about employer
liability, other than to recommend that courts look to traditional agency principles in detennining
liability. Further, the Court has provided the courts with no clear way to determine when an
environment becomes hostile; it has merely stated that courts use a totality of circumstances
approach in deciding each claim. Finally, difficult legal dilemmas such as whether free
expression may be limited to prevent sexual harassment have already arisen, and must be
resolved.
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